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Research design:

Understanding recent trends in education policy making in sub-Saharan Africa:

The case of the contract teacher policy

Revised version

1. Introduction

The international community has committed itself in 1990 to bring education to all the citizens by 2015. This goal was adopted as a priority by governments of the developing countries which comprise the large share of children out of school. Since then, various education policies have been implemented. The results are positive, but some preoccupations arise. As more children are going to school, the education system requires more resources. One of the greatest challenges is the rising need for teachers. Estimations from the UNESCO show that sub-Saharan African countries must recruit more than 1.6 million teachers before 2015 in order to achieve Education For All (UNESCO-UIS 2006, p. 42). These countries are already facing considerable resource constraints anyway, and cannot continue to hire new teachers at the traditional salaries. Thus budget constraints led many governments to reform their teacher recruitment policy altogether, and to move from the recruitment of traditional civil servants to the recruitment of "low cost teachers" on a contractual basis. These teachers are now widely known as "state's contract teachers". As compared to the traditional civil servant teacher, the typical contract teacher is characterized not only by a "short term" contract and a significantly reduced salary, but also by a lower level of qualification, and a shorter duration of pre-service training. Contract teachers' working conditions are often considered as precarious, and protests against the adoption of the contract teacher policy were frequently observed. One of the major arguments, apart from considerations of teachers' self-esteem, is the perceived reduction in education quality this policy would necessarily bring about. While these discussions were going on without conclusion, many sub-Saharan African governments, especially in francophone countries, decided quickly to adopt the policy. The share of contract teachers in the teaching staff is increasingly high, often exceeding 50%.

As the contract teacher policy is still a rather recent phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, research considering this new policy is still very limited. Moreover, it has focused exclusively on the impact on teachers' motivation and education outcomes (quality and enrolment). Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the political aspect of the reform. What rendered the policy reform possible? What explains the diversity in policy outcomes (contract conditions)? Who are the relevant political actors driving the reform process?

The research aims at addressing these questions. While section 2 discusses the origins of the contract teacher policy, section 3 presents the variety in the policy outcomes across countries. This will lead to the refinement of the research questions in section 4. The theoretical approach and the methodology that can be used for our investigation will be discussed in section 5.

The comparative analysis suggested here will focus only on countries within francophone sub-Saharan Africa. As will be shown later, even within these countries, there is substantial variation in context, actors and outcomes of the contract teacher policy. Adding the differences in colonial inheritance would render the picture even more diverse and increase the difficulty to establish any clear link between causes and effects. The research will concentrate on primary education as it is the most concerned by the Education For All goals.

2. The origins of the contract teacher policy

In francophone African countries, a reform of the teacher recruitment policy has been adopted during a process of major change in function of the education system. In these countries, school was created during the colonial era with the mission of training the elite so they could serve as intermediary between the colonizer and the population (White 1996, p. 12). The central authorities were the main education service provider[1]; as a result, education policies where designed in a strongly top-down approach. Former colonies needed a small number of teachers to train the equally small number of students. The authorities had the responsibility to hire the teachers, the possibility to require a high level of qualification and to pay high salaries[2]. After independence, when the civil service had to be staffed with nationals, human capital was extremely scarce and therefore highly remunerated. Moreover, many francophone African governments initially maintained the elitist view of the education system.

This view started changing in the 1980s. At the World Education Forum held in Jomtien in 1990 as well as in Dakar in 2000, countries committed themselves to bring education to all their citizens. This was a clear signal that schools, at least at the fundamental level, should be opened to all the children. The same objective was adopted by the United Nations as the second of the Millennium Development Goals: "*Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling*" (UN 2007). The challenge was to transform an education system initially devoted to a small number of children into an education system able to accommodate millions of children (mass education). Since 1990, various policies have been implemented, at the national level as well as at the international level in order to meet the target: free primary education, nomadic schools (UNESCO 2007; De Ravignan 2007, p. 69), compulsory education, modifications of curricula, etc. However, demand for education was still much higher than public supply. For this reason, some communities decided to build their own schools, entirely financed by the parents, or partially financed by the state, and to even hire their own teachers.

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[1] In some cities, missionary schools where also created but they were acting under the control of the state.
[2] The Lamine Gueye's law II, adopted at the French national assembly in 1950, states that all civil servants' salaries in the colonies should be set at the same level as in France. For more details, see Bourdon and Nkengne Nkengne (2007, p5).

Statistics available on the UNESCO-UIS website for the period 1991 and 2003 show an increase in the enrolment rate for almost all the countries (Cf. Appendix 1). However, this positive result was rapidly overshadowed by further preoccupations:

- Pupil-teacher ratios and class size rose significantly, sometimes reaching national averages greater than 60 (e.g. Central African Republic and Mali, see World Bank 2006b),
- Scarcity of teachers is particularly acute in some rural or remote areas where teachers do not want to be posted (Duthilleul 2005, p. 41),
- Some children are still refused entry into the education system because of the lack of teachers.

To overcome these problems, many countries need to increase significantly the size of the teaching staff. In a publication specifically dedicated to this topic, UNESCO-UIS (2006) estimated at 1.6 millions the number of additional primary school teachers to be recruited in sub-Saharan Africa in order to reach the EFA goals. Estimations are base on the hypothesis of an average class size of 40 (UNESCO-UIS 2006, p. 42). Within sub-Sahara Africa, the challenge is greatest in the francophone countries of the Sahel region (Bourdon et al. 2007, p. 3).

In the tradition of the education system in francophone countries, teachers are hired by the government as civil servants, with a high level of qualification, secure contract, and relatively high salary. Hiring the required number of teachers at the above conditions is, however, physically and financially impossible.

- Financial constraints: To be able to hire more teachers as civil servants, the states need to increase their education expenditure, which is strenuous: most of francophone African countries belong to the group of low income countries and are implementing structural adjustment programs, initiated by the International Monetary Fund (the core element of this program is usually a reduction in state expenditure). On the other hand, teacher salary represents a large share of the education budget; 75% to 92% of public education resources at primary level are used to pay teachers (Bourdon and Nkengne Nkengne 2007, p. 6). An increase in the overall teacher salaries will leave no room for the implementation of other activities in the sector (class construction, allocation of school books, etc.)

- Physical constraints: In most of the countries, primary teachers are hired as civil servants and the recruitment policy states that a minimum education level equal to thirteen years of education is required. With this condition, it will be difficult for some countries to hire enough teachers because the number of people attaining this level of education is simply not high enough.

The solution adopted by the governments to overcome the financial and physical constraints is a reform of the teacher recruitment policy. Instead of hiring teachers as civil servants, they decided to hire teachers on contracts of limited duration. Henceforth, it was also possible to reduce the required level of education to enter the teaching profession and to pay lower salaries (sometimes half or even

one fourth of the salary received by civil servants). Moreover, in many countries, pedagogical training was suppressed or reduced (in Senegal, from 2 years to 4 months; in Niger, from 1 year to 45 days).

This kind of reform is not entirely new. Other regions of the World (Latin America, India) have adopted similar reforms while facing similar constraints (Duthilleul 2005). As already mentioned above, even in francophone African countries, communities often privately recruited non civil servant teachers to teach in their schools, sometimes with the financial support of the government[3].

While these private initiatives, mostly restricted to remote rural areas did not evoke any kind of public reaction, the official adoption of the contract teacher policy led to protests and controversies on the issue of the role and identity of the teacher (Welmond 2002), teacher quality and the relation with education quality. The World Bank strongly, supporting the new recruitment programs by making them an implicit pre-condition for education sector support through development aid, equally faced heavy criticism (Welmond 2002, p. 64). Despite all criticism, especially from teacher unions, most governments in francophone sub-Saharan Africa decided to reform the teacher policy, in many cases at an unprecedented speed: Senegal was the first country to officially adopt the policy in 1995; by 2005, eight ?!? (To be confirmed) additional countries had also officially adopted it.

Initial research on the issue of contract teachers focused on its impact on enrolment rates and education quality (Bernard et al. 2004; Bourdon et al. 2007; Duthilleul 2005; PASEC 2003, 2004 and 2005; Vegas and De Laat 2003). Results show that the policy has contributed to the increase of the enrolment rates. The effect on education quality is less clear. However, among researchers, there seems to be an agreement on the fact that contract teachers are not systematically less efficient than regular teachers and that the overall effect may depend on the details of the national implementation and contract specifications.

While the recent literature thus provides us with some insights on the actual effect of the contract teacher policy, the relevant political questions behind this process remain fully uninvestigated. We may ask, for instance, whether the budgetary reasons mentioned above are really enough to explain the rush towards this policy. Why then, do we observe so much variation across countries? What are the political processes and the negotiations that led to the official adoption of the policy in such an unprecedented speed?

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[3] For example, see the case of Togo during the years 1980 (PASEC 2004).

3. Variability in the formulation of the contract teacher policy

Education systems in francophone African countries are almost always organized in the same way, mirroring the French education system. As all these countries are confronted with the same problem (to hire more teachers in a context of a lack of resources) and have referred to contract teacher policy to solve it, one could have expected them to formulate the policy the same way. In fact, this is not the case. There are great differences in contract teachers' conditions (Duthilleul 2005; Bourdon et al. 2007) in terms of:

- Salary
- Duration of the contract and possibility to renew or to secure the position
- Authority responsible for the recruitment : government vs. communities,
- Level of qualification required,
- Duration of the pre service training,

While in Niger the government decides about the number of contract teachers to be hired and where to place them, in Mali and Chad, the government provides financial resources to the communities and delegates the responsibility for hiring and monitoring the contract teachers (in this case called "community teachers"). In Guinea, the government fully stopped the recruitment of teachers as civil servants, but still assumes responsibility for teacher recruitment and training through a shortened 15 or 18 months pre-service training program supported by the World Bank. In other countries like Niger and Senegal, the government simultaneously hired both civil servants and contract teachers. More variation in contract teachers conditions are provided in Appendix 2.

Few years after the implementation of the contract teacher policy, the primary education teaching staff consist of three mains status groups, namely: civil servants, state contract teachers and community teachers. Their shares vary across countries as shown in Table 1. The proportion of para teachers (meaning state's contract teachers and teachers hired by the communities) is increasingly high; up to 74% in Niger, 65% in Togo. Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire are the only countries where the share of civil servant remains higher than 60%.

Salaries constitute one axis of differentiation among teachers. Contract teachers receive lower salaries than civil servants. Among contract teachers, those paid by the community receive lower salaries than those paid by the state. As can be observed from Table 1, the ratio showing differences in salary levels varies considerably across countries.

Table 1: Share of contract teachers and relative salary as unit of GDP per capita

Countries	Status (%)			Salaries as unit of GDP per capita					Government resources as % of GDP (Year 2000 or close)
	Civil servants	Contract teachers		Civil servants			Contract teachers		
		State	Community	Total	Certified	Assistant	State	Community	
Benin (2005)	50,4	23,8	25,7	5,2	5,7	3,9	2,1	1,1	16
Burkina Faso (2002)	64,1	23,6	12,2	5,8	7,1	5,1	5,6	2,2	11
Cameroon (2002)	34,9	20,4	44,7	5,3	5,7	4,1	1,4	0,8	20
Chad (2003)	38,4	17,2	44,4	7,4	8,2	6,0	1,7	0,4	8
Dem. Rep. Congo (2005)	55,0	14,0	31,0	2,8	2,9	2,62	1,3	-	-
Guinea (2003)	30,9	38,9	30,1	3,4	3,5	2,7	1,9	1,2	11
Côte d'Ivoire (2001)	87,3	0,0	12,7	4,8	5,0	3,0	-	-	17
Madagascar (2005)	46,8	0,0	53,2	4,4	-	-	-	1,0	11
Mali (2004)	35,7	34,7	29,6	7,5	-	-	4,8	1,0	16
Niger (2006)	25,8	71,0	3,2	8,9	10,5	8,0	3,5	-	11
Senegal (2003)	43,6	41,5	15,0	5,7	6,2	4,9	2,6	na	20
Togo (2001)	35,0	30,5	34,6	6,4	7,8	5,4	3,3	1,3	15
Mean (12 cases)	47,6	24,0	28,4	5,6	6,2	4,5	2,8	(1,2)	14,2

Source: Adapted from Bourdon and Nkengne Nkengne (2007), UNESCO-BREDA and Pôle de Dakar (2005), Mingat (2004), Bernard et al. (2004).

Up to now, there is no study which explains the reasons why the type of contracts varies so much. All the governments advocate budgetary reasons to the adoption of the reform; therefore, one might expect the variation in contract teacher salary to be a result of variation in countries' resources: richer government should give higher salaries to contract teachers. This argument also holds for the duration of the pre-service training. However, this is not the case (as table 1 shows). For example, while Burkina Faso and Guinea mobilize the same government resources as percentage of GDP, state contract teachers receive 5.6 times GDP per capita in Burkina Faso and only 1.9 times GDP per capita in Guinea. In addition, the duration of the pre-service training in Guinea is longer than in Burkina Faso.

It thus remains unclear what actually determines the national features of the reform process. Given their importance for the impact of the contract teacher policy (Bourdon et al. 2007), as well as – at least potentially – for the sustainability of the whole process, it appears highly relevant to investigate into the key elements driving the policy formulation.

4. Research questions

Summing up the discussion from the above two sections, we note that many questions arising in the context of the contract teacher policy remain so far unresolved.

At first glance, reasons for the adoption of the contract teacher policy given by governments seem to be clear and the shift towards the policy appears as unavoidable. One can then wonder, however, why the policy has not been adopted earlier, for instance when the governments were contributing to the remuneration of community teachers. The lack of resources has been a reality of those countries for a long time without changing the recruitment policy; what happened in the policy arena and allowed the government to expand and render official the recruitment of teachers at lower salaries? Why was it so necessary for the states to adopt the reform at that particular moment (mainly between 1998 and 2002)? The sudden common move toward contract teacher policy suggests that the budgetary argument (which is an economic argument) does not fully explain the states' decision (which is a political one). Put together, these elements lead to the following question: ***What determines the willingness of a government to adopt the contract teacher policy (official adoption)?***

Once the adoption of the policy is a fact, the diversity in the policy outcome (I refer here to the policy formulation) in terms of the duration of the contract, the possibility to renew the contract, the level of salaries, the duration of the initial training and the authority responsible for the recruitment can be examined. Our second question is therefore: ***What explains the differences in the contract teacher policy outcome (policy formulation)?***

5. Theoretical background and methodology

The policy cycle constitutes a relevant analytical framework often used to understand the process of policy making. It is also known as the stage heuristic. Developed by Lasswell (1956), Jones (1970, 1977, 1984) Anderson (1975, 1979) and Brewer and DeLeon (1983), it models the policy process as a series of political activities consisting of: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation and evaluation, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 1: The policy cycle

Source: Knill and Tosun (2008), p. 500.

One needs to analyze each steps of the diagram in order to understand the policy making. In the case of the contract teacher policy, two of the five steps have already been investigated: agenda setting (the lack of teachers is largely recognized and countries are already dealing with it, in collaboration with international organizations) and evaluation (as mentioned previously, all the previous research on contract teacher policy focus on its impact). The aim of this study is to complement the knowledge on the contract teacher policy making in a particular region (francophone sub-Saharan Africa) by analyzing the policy adoption and the policy formulation. I define contract teacher policy adoption as the official decision on a law at the governmental level allowing the recruitment of teachers on contract term. By policy formulation, I refer to the policy outcome; ie the official description of contract teacher conditions. The choice to analyze the policy adoption before the policy formulation is motivated by two arguments:

i-   In most of the countries (see Table 1), teachers on contract terms existed before the public debate on the issue became salient, leading to an official recognition of this teacher status (adoption).

ii-   Contract teachers' conditions (policy formulation) were designed within the process of the policy adoption. As these conditions vary from one county to another, I prefer to consider these differences in a second step of the analysis.

Although policy adoption and policy formulation are considered separately, my intention is not to analyze them independently.

The policy cycle has been a salient topic during the last 30 years (Sabatier 1999, DeLeon 1999). This approach to research was widely criticized because of the lack of a theoretical framework guiding the studies. In the recent years, scholars have developed various frameworks to overcome the issue (Sabatier 2007). In a contribution to the book "Comparative Politics" by Daniele Caramani 2008, Knill and Tosun explained how recently developed theoretical frameworks can be embodied in the policy cycle. I will use one of these recent theoretical frameworks (innovation and diffusion) to answer to the first research question.

5.1- What determines the willingness of a government to adopt the contract teacher policy?

In the context of francophone African countries, governments' decision to move towards contract teacher policy is considered as a major innovation in the education sector. Before 1990, education policy was decided by the government (sometime with the support of the Bretton Woods Institutions). The third wave of democracy has brought into scene new actors who influence policy making. Education literature generally takes into account the following actors: government, donors and international organizations, non governmental organization (NGOs), unions (here: teacher unions) and communities (here: parent-teacher associations); what can be their effect on the teacher policy making? Some countries have adopted the policy before others, which suggest that a diffusion process exist and the information available changes from one country to another over time. In fact, information about risks and benefits from the policy process in one country may spread to neighboring countries

and directly influence the decision and this should be taken into account. Up to know reasons given to the adoption of this policy do not consider these realities; moreover, as shown previously, they cannot fully explain the adoption of the reform. During the years 90s, Stokes Berry and William Berry (cf. Berry and Berry 2007) have developed a model of the policy process called innovation and diffusion. According to this model, policy adoption or policy innovation is a result of internal determinants and a diffusion process, reflecting external "pressure" (or determinants) on the country. The general form of the model is:

$$\text{ADOPTION}_{i,t} = f(\text{MOTIVATION}_{i,t}, \text{RESOURCES/OBSTACLES}_{i,t}, \text{OTHERS POLICIES}_{i,t}, \text{EXTERNAL}_{i,t})$$

This model constitutes a useful framework for our analysis. Considering contract teacher policy adoption as a dummy variable, it is possible to assess if a set of conditions is associated with the willingness of a country to adopt the teacher reform. Table 2 below summarizes the variables expected to be relevant in this context.

Table 2: List of possible explanations to the adoption of the contract teacher policy

(The table will be developed during the dissertation)

General specification	Determinant (variable)
Adoption	- Official decision of the country to hire teachers on contract terms
Motivation	- Opinion of government authorities in charge of education regarding the policy - Pressure from communities - Crucial election to be organized within the 12 months following the decision
Resource / Obstacle	- Existence of external resource to implement the policy (fast track initiative funds or other external fund) - Economic development - Existence of a strong teacher union
Other policies	- Share of already existing contract teachers - Degree of involvement of the community (decentralization)
External	- Numbers of "neighboring" countries that have adopted the policy - Pressure from IOs (World Bank) - Participation to international conferences on teacher issues

Deeper examination of the role that these variables (and possibly additional ones) play in the policy adoption and further specification will be provided later.

Berry and Berry (2007) argues that once the variables are identified, the best way to test their effect on the policy adoption is to run an event history analysis. In this case, this will not be possible because I have too few country level observations: at the best, there will be 12 countries with data collected from 1995 to the most recent years available (2005 or 2006). I therefore need to refer to another method. Covadonga and Gilardi (2005) discuss alternative ways to estimate a diffusion model. In the light of their arguments, I intend to use a panel regression to test the effects of the independent variables on the adoption of the contract teacher policy.

5.2- What explains the differences in the contract teacher policy outcome?

Once the countries have adopted the contract teacher policy, it is still unclear what explains the differences in the policy formulation. To answer the second research question, this part will be structured into two chapters: the first describes differences in policy outcomes and the second presents a theoretical model of explanation of these differences and discusses the methodology that can be used to test it.

Description of the policy outcome (policy formulation)

Although variations in the formulation of the contract teacher policy are admitted, a comprehensive description of these differences is not available. I intend to fill the gap by giving for each country a detailed feature of the policy outcome. For the purpose, I will examine different written sources (ministerial documents, Education For All country status reports, UNESCO statistics, etc.) and carry out interviews.

Contract teacher recruitment is opposed to the traditional recruitment of teachers as civil servants. The question then arises: in which respect those policies differ? To answer this question, I will examine the key elements of the traditional recruitment process. Some general elements have already been mentioned above:

- Salary
- Duration of the contract and possibility to renew or to secure the position
- Authority responsible for the recruitment : government vs. communities,
- Level of qualification required,
- Duration of the pre service training,

I will complement this list in light of the existing civil servant regulations. I will then compare policy formulation according to these key dimensions. Doing this for all the countries that have adopted the policy will help identifying patterns of policy outcomes.

As this part focus on differences in the policy outcome, I intend to build a synthetic index measuring these differences. There are various methods that help building a synthetic index from a set of variables: e.g. means, principal components, hierarchical clusters. The method will be chosen

depending on the data. In practice, the index aims at assessing to which extent contract teacher formulation departs from the traditional civil servant teacher requirements.

Explanation of the differences in the policy formulation (policy outcome)

Once differences in policy outcomes are depicted, we still need to understand what explains them. In her famous paper "The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making in France, Switzerland and Sweden" published in 1993, Ellen Immergut developed a model to explain differences in policy outcomes. According to the model, formal constitutional rules and electoral results establish a framework in which policy making takes place; specific institutional mechanisms structures the decision process in a given polity, and by doing so, provide interest groups with different opportunities for influencing political decision (Immergut 1993, p. 66). In this setting, veto point plays a crucial role. The following diagram summarizes the model.

Figure 2: Political arena and veto points

| ARENAS	MOVES	RESULTS
Executive		
	Can Members of Parliament Overturn Executive Decision? (Stable Parliamentary Majority? Party Discipline?)	→ If Yes, then Veto Point → If Yes, then No Veto Point
Legislative		
	Can Members of the Electorate Overturn Parliamentary Decisions? (Shifting Voters? Referendum?)	→ If Yes, then Veto Point → If No, then No Veto Point
Electoral		

Source: Immergut, E. (1992), p. 66.

Immergut does not consider the possibility that within the executive there might be oppositions to the policy and that these oppositions can also affect the formulation, which is often the case. In Figure 3, I augment the model so as to take this into account. I also consider the possibility of the organization of a public debate prior to any decision.

Specifically for the case of African countries, I eliminate the possibility of a referendum, because at my knowledge, a referendum on a public policy issue has never been organized in those countries. Figure 3 presents an augmented version of the conceptual model explaining differences in policy outcome, adapted to the African context.

Figure 3: Conceptual model explaining differences in policy outcomes: adoption process x actors' strength

- **Po = Initial Policy, teachers as civil servants**

- **P1 = Alternative policy, teachers on contract term, expected to depart from Po**

- **N = Negotiation point, possibility for actors to lobby**

- **Actors = Government, Parliament, World Bank, Unions (civil servant), Unions (para-teachers), Communities with the support of NGOs**

- **Assumption: The government will not agree on a policy different from P1 if an alternative negotiation point exists**

If a government wants to adopt a policy, it should first formulate it. This formulation process can be difficult, especially if there are people within the government who are against the policy. This is the case with the contract teacher policy: within the executive, the ministry of education is the main actor responsible of the policy formulation. Some members of the ministries, sometimes those who are in charge of the formulation of the contract teacher policy belong to civil servant teachers unions and can see the new policy as a threat for their activity (as the new policy will necessarily lead to a reduction in the number of unions' members and therefore unions' resources). Other actors who are against the policy can associate or get into negotiation with them in order to formulate the policy at their advantage. If this happens, the government will face a strong opposition on any attempt to depart from the traditional civil servant policy. However, it might also be the case that things go the other way round: within the government, if lot of members agrees with the new policy, there won't be any strong opposition and the new policy can easily depart from the old one. So, the initial formulation of the policy (the proposal) by the government will be subject to actors' strength or ability to influence it designing.

Once the government agrees on a proposal, there are different possibilities through which it can make it pass. It can decide alone by decree or send the proposition to the parliament for a vote or enter in negotiation with the civil society. I assume that the government will act rationally and will avoid as much as possible oppositions to its position. I further expect that:

- If a government chooses to adopt the new policy via a decree, the policy outcome will be a unique function of the strength of the intra government opposition (The outcome will be as describe previously).

- In case the proposal goes to the parliament, if the parliament is dominated by the government, then the policy outcome will depart from the traditional policy. Conversely, if the parliament is dominated by the opposition, I expect the policy outcome to be close to the traditional policy.

- In case of negotiations with the civil society, the resulting policy formulation will depend on the relative strength of the actors involved: government, civil servant teachers unions, contract teachers unions, and communities (supported by non governmental organizations). The government can decide to adopt the outcome of the negotiation by a decree, or send it to the parliament. We expect that in case the government faces strong opposition in the negotiation, it will prefer to send the proposal to the parliament for the final decision.

Each adoption process embodies a negotiation point. It is therefore possible for all the actors to lobby, given their ability to do this, in order to get their interest taken into account in the final policy formulation; even if they are not directly associated to the negotiations. Therefore, the impact of the lobbies should be taken into account. Figure 3 depicts the model showing the combination of the adoption process and actors' strength on the differences in the policy outcome.

I posit that "**differences in the policy outcome can be explained by a combination of the policy adoption process and the ability of actors to support their interest: the more a government faces negotiations points in the adoption process of the contract teacher policy, the more the policy outcome will be closed to the usual civil servant requirements; governments that face less opposition to the policy will end up with contract teachers conditions very different from those of the civil servants**". This can be represented in the following equation:

$$PO = f(Po, N, G, U1, U2, C, P, N*G, N*U1, N*U2, N*C, Z)$$

PO: policy outcome, measured as distance to the old policy (level of salary, duration of the pre-service training, duration of the contract and possibility to renew).

Po: Old policy; as the initial policy can vary from one country to another, I need to take this into account in the explanation of differences in the new policy.

N: Number of negotiation points, reflecting the adoption process chose by the government.

G: Government strength, taking into account the impact of lobbies (from the World Bank, communities, contract teacher unions, etc.).

U1:   Civil servant teachers unions' strength, taking into account the impact of lobbies.

U2:   Contract teachers unions' strength, taking into account the impact of lobbies.

C: Communities strength, with the support of non governmental organization.

P: Parliaments' tendency (pro government, pro opposition), taking into account the impact of lobbies.

Z: Set of control variables like GDP per capita, level of education decentralization, etc.

N*G, N*U1, N*U2, N*C: interactions terms of adoption process and actors' strength. I believe that the more the negotiation points, the more opponents to the policy will have the possibility to influence the outcome.

Further variable specification will be made during the dissertation. I intend to investigate the following points for each country:

- What are the institutions that shaped the context in which the policy was adopted?
- Who are the actors involved in the policy and what are their interests?
- Which negotiations took place among the actors and how effective were they?

Answering these questions requires detailed investigations. I will proceed by document analysis and interviews of the different actors involved in the process. A problem I might encounter is that interviews will be related to past events (more than 5 years ago). There is no guarantee that people will still remember exactly how all the decisions were made and their views may be biased by the currently perceived success or failure of the policy.

The best way to test the hypothesis (estimation of the model) is to run an econometric regression. But, as I am working on a small number of countries and have almost the same number of independent variables, this is not possible (not enough degree of freedom). I need to refer to alternative estimation methods. I intend to use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis or Fuzzy set; they specifically deal with small N data.

Through the example of the contract teacher policy, the aim of this research is to give insights on the process of education policy making in the context of developing countries.

Schedule

Oct. 07 – Feb. 08	Readings : - Institutions and institutional reforms in francophone African countries - Education in francophone African countries: issues and education policy making - Literature on policy analysis and comparative politics
Marc. 08 – Jun. 08	Theoretical background and Methodology : - Clarification of the theoretical background on which to base the methodology - Development of the methodology: variable specification, questionnaire, interview guidelines, list of documents to collect.
July 08 – Dec. 08	Field work: - Data collection
Jan. 09 – Marc. 09	Data analysis : - production of results in order to answer to the research questions
Apr. 09 – Sept. 09	Paper writings : - Production of a paper on each of the research questions
Oct. 09 – Dec. 09	End of the dissertation: - Writing of the dissertation report on the basis of the papers

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Appendix 1: Gross enrolment rate in francophone's African countries (1991-2003)

Source: UNESCO-UIS (2007).

Note: The gross enrolment rate in the primary level is the number of pupils in primary education divided by the number of children with the age to be in primary school. It can thus be greater than 100%.

Appendix 2: Characteristics of contract teachers in francophone African countries

The below from Bourdon et al. (2007, p. 10) provides a comparative overview of the characteristics of the contract teacher programs across 12 francophone countries

Country	Category (local names)	Reasons for reform	Minimum level of education and training	Duration of professional pre-service training	Duration of contract	Career plan or seniority bonus	Source of financing	Employer Management	Regularity of payment
Benin	State contract teachers	limited state resources	Junior secondary	Training periods in a 4-year sequence	2 years renewable once	Under discussion	State	State	Yes
	Community teachers	"Spontaneous" schools	Flexible	Flexible			Parents	Local	Generally yes
Burkina Faso	Community teachers		Flexible		fixed-term contract		Regional	Community-Based	
	Contract teachers	Limited state resources	Secondary+ Selection	1 year	Permanent	Yes	State / external	Decentralized level	Yes
Cameroon	Vacataire	Limited state resources	Secondary+ Selection	1 year	Formally 2 years, but considered as permanent	No till 2006	State	Decentralized level till 2006	No
	Community teachers	Local initiatives	Flexible		1 year	No	Parents	Community	
Chad	Community teacher	Limited state resources /creation of community schools	end junior secondary + selection process of applicants	9 months on the job; 4 months for those with a diploma	9 months (school year) but can be transformed into permanent	No	Parents and state	Community	No
Congo (Rep. of)	Contract teachers	Limited state resources	Junior secondary+ selection process	2 years apprentice ship with continuous training	Formally 2 years, but considered as permanent	No			
	Volunteers	Local emergency program	Junior secondary+ selection process	not fully documented	1 year, but can be transformed into permanent	Local arrangements		Community, public service	Yes
	Community teachers (benevolents)	Parental initiative			Limited			Community	
Guinea	Contract teachers	Limited state resources	Full secondary + selection	9 or 12 months	1 year but can be transformed into permanent	No	State	Decentralized level	Generally yes
Madagascar	Contract teachers	Frozen recruitment for civil servants	Local initiatives	Flexible	Formally 1 year, but considered as permanent	Under discussion	State HIPC initiative	State	Generally yes
	Community teachers	Local initiatives	Junior or full secondary	sometimes	No contract	No	Parents and aid	Community	No
Mali	Contract teachers	Limited state resources	grades 11 or 12	3 months	Permanent	In progress	State	Decentralized level	Yes
	Community teachers	Local initiatives	Flexible				Donors / community	Communities / parents	
Mauritania	Temporary staff	Lack of competencies	Junior secondary	3 months	Permanent or 1 year	None	State	State	Yes
	Retirees					None	State	State	Yes
Niger	Contract teachers	Limited state resources	Junior secondary + 1 year in teacher training school + selection	1 year	Permanent contract after 4 years of experience	No	State + Aid	Decentralized level	No
Senegal	Educational volunteers	Limited state resources	Junior secondary+ selection process	3 months , 6 months after 2000	2 years for volunteers, half become permanent	Yes	State	Decentralized level	Yes
Togo	"Auxiliaries" or Contract teachers,	Limited state resources	Junior secondary+ selection process	from none up to 3years	Permanent	Yes, but limited	State	Decentralized	Yes
	Community teachers (volunteers)		Flexible	Irregular, only administered by NGO			Communities / parents / aid	Communities / parents	

Source: Bourdon et al. (2007, p. 10), adapted and updated from Mingat (2004), Ndoye (2004) and Duthilleul (2005) using various World Bank education sector Country Status Reports (see e.g. World Bank 2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2007 and World Bank (Africa Region) and Pôle de Dakar (2007) and expert communications.